PNASJClub
Laundering and evasion in response to antislavery policies in Brazil's cattle sector.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · · Journal Article
Mittelberg, Skidmore + more
Abstract ↗AI summary
The abstract is read at the publisher; the summary is JClub's.
Ranchers in Brazil's cattle sector significantly evade sanctions by laundering cattle or selling to nonsignatory slaughterhouses after being listed for modern slavery, undermining policy efforts.
- Why it matters: Eradicating modern slavery in supply chains is hindered by the limited effectiveness of current enforcement strategies, especially when upstream actors can evade sanctions.
- What they did: Using data on millions of cattle transactions, the study examined how ranchers responded after being added to the "Dirty List," revealing evasive behaviors such as laundering cattle through compliant intermediaries or selling to non-signatory slaughterhouses.
- The result: These evasive responses reduced the financial impact of listing and likely allowed products linked to slavery to enter international markets, emphasizing the need for upstream monitoring to ensure slavery-free supply chains.
The findingWhy it mattersWhat they didThe result